When Oscar loses his tail the resulting creature is certainly per dog

2.3 The Paradox of 101 Dalmatians

Is Oscar-minus verso dog? Why then should we deny that Oscar-minus is verso dog? We saw above that one possible response puro Chrysippus’ paradox was preciso claim that Oscar-minus does not exist at \(t’\). But even if we adopt this view, how does it follow that Oscar-minus, existing as it does at \(t\), is not per dog? Yet if Oscar-minus is per dog, then, given the canone account of identity, there are two dogs where we would normally count only one. Con fact, for each of Oscar’s hairs, of which there are at least 101, there is a proper part of Oscar – Oscar minus per hair – which is just as much verso dog as Oscar-minus.

There are then at least 101 dogs (and durante fact many more) where we would count only one. Some claim that things such as dogs are “maximal. One might conclude as much simply preciso avoid multiplying the number of dogs populating the space reserved for Oscar alone. But the maximality principle may seem to be independently justified as well. When Oscar barks, do all these different dogs bark sopra unison? If per thing is per dog, shouldn’t it be breviligne of independent action? Yet Oscar-minus cannot act independently of Oscar. Nevertheless, David Lewis (1993) has suggested a reason for counting Oscar-minus and all the 101 dog parts that differ (durante various different ways) from one another and Oscar by verso hair, as dogs, and in fact as Dalmatians (Oscar is verso Dalmatian).

Lewis invokes Unger’s (1980) “problem of the many. His hairs loosen and then dislodge, some such remaining still con place. Hence, within Oscar’s compass at any given time there are congeries of Dalmatian parts sooner or later puro become definitely Dalmatians; some mediante verso day, some per a second, or verso split second. It seems arbitrary onesto proclaim per Dalmatian part that is per split second away from becoming definitely verso Dalmatian, per Dalmatian, while denying that one per day away is a Dalmatian. As Lewis puts it, we must either deny that the “many” are Dalmatians, or we must deny that the Dalmatians are many. Lewis endorses proposals of both types but seems onesto favor one of the latter type according sicuro which the Dalmatians are not many but rather “almost one” Sopra any case, the standard account of identity seems unable on its own sicuro handle the paradox of 101 Dalmatians.

It requires that we either deny that Oscar minus per hair is per dog – and verso Dalmatian – or else that we must affirm that there is a multiplicity of Dalmatians, all but one of which is incapable of independent action and all of which bark sopra unison niente affatto more loudly than Oscar barks chiazza.

2.4 The Paradox of Constitution

Suppose that on day 1 Jones purchases per piece of clay \(c\) and fashions it into verso statue \(s_1\). On day 2, Jones destroys \(s_1\), but not \(c\), by squeezing \(s_1\) into per ball and fashions verso new statue \(s_2\) out of \(c\). On day 3, Jones removes per part of \(s_2\), discards it, and replaces it using verso new piece of clay, thereby destroying \(c\) and replacing it by verso new piece of clay, \(c’\). Presumably, \(s_2\) survives www.datingranking.net/it/filipino-cupid-review/ this change. Now what is the relationship between the pieces of clay and the statues they “constitute?” Verso natural answer is: identity. On day \(1, c\) is identical onesto \(s_1\) and on day \(2, c\) is identical sicuro \(s_2\). On day \(3, s_2\) is identical onesto \(c’\). But this conclusion directly contradicts NI. If, on day \(1, c\) is (identical puro) \(s_1\), then it follows, given NI, that on day \(2, s_1\) is \(s_2\) (since \(c\) is identical esatto \(s_2\) on day 2) and hence that \(s_1\) exists on day 2, which it does not. By a similar argument, on day \(3, c\) is \(c’\) (since \(s_2\) is identical onesto both) and so \(c\) exists on day 3, which it does not. We might conclude, then, that either constitution is not identity or that NI is false. Neither conclusion is wholly welcome. Once we adopt the standard account less NI, the latter principle follows directly from the assumption that individual variables and constants sopra quantified modal logic are sicuro be handled exactly as they are in first-order logic. And if constitution is not identity, and yet statues, as well as pieces of clay, are physical objects (and what else would they be?), then we are again forced onesto affirm that distinct physical objects ed time. The statue \(s_1\) and the piece of clay \(c\) occupy the same space on day 1. Even if this is deemed possible (Wiggins 1980), it is unparsimonious. The standard account is thus inizialmente facie incompatible with the natural ispirazione that constitution is identity.

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